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BOOK REVIEWS

Daalder, Ivo H., and Michael E. O’Hanlon. Winning
Ugly: NATO’s War to Save Kosovo. Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. 343pp. $26.95

Since the end of the Cold War, Nato has
been experiencing an identity crisis that
has not yet been completely resolved. In
the last decade instability has been Nato’s
principal adversary, and the Balkans, as a
result of the atrocities of Slobodan
Milosevic, became its prime area of interest. In March 1999, following the Serb tyrant’s driving of eight hundred thousand
Albanian Kosovars from Serbia, Nato
fought, and won, a war to return and
protect Kosovo’s Albanian population.
Winning Ugly is a recounting of the
causes, conduct, and consequences of
this war. It is derived from interviews of
many of its central players by experts on
Balkan policy and security affairs. Not
surprisingly, this conflict has been dissected and closely scrutinized by many
pundits, because its lessons will play a
central role in fashioning future alliance
defense policies, as well as U.S. force
planning and doctrine development.
Daalder and O’Hanlon scrutinize virtually all elements of the Kosovo operation,
and they are both understanding and
critical. As to the causes and inevitability
of the conflict, the authors conclude that,
given Milosevic’s perfidy and malice, it
would have been difficult for Nato to
avoid taking military action. As to the result, they unabashedly declare Nato the
victor, with few qualifications. In fact,
the authors’ assessment should be labeled
“near term,” since we have yet to witness
enduring stability in the region as a result of the conflict and the subsequent
Nato “occupation” of the province.
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Daalder and O’Hanlon’s examination of
the conduct of the war, however, is the
best part of the book, bringing to light
the strategic and tactical mistakes
committed by Nato’s heads of state, diplomats, and generals alike. Perhaps the
most important of the internal conflicts
were between (and among) Americans, a
point underlined in General Wesley
Clark’s recent account of the Kosovo
conflict, Waging Modern War.
The role that the air campaign played to
achieve overall success in the war is a
point hotly debated in defense-policy circles. Kosovo was proclaimed exclusively
an air war, President Clinton having
promised that the United States had no
intention of fighting a ground war in the
Balkans. It was a remarkably successful
one, at that; air defense capability by the
Yugoslav armed forces was moderate, yet
no Nato pilot lost his life in combat. But
this was not initially the air war that U.S.
Air Force strategists had envisioned—pilots were restricted to flying above fifteen
thousand feet, and target sets were limited early in the war due to asset availability and bad weather. Most
importantly, the thrust of “effects-based
operations” (in this case, bending the enemy’s will through paralyzing the country’s infrastructure) was diluted, as the
Nato alliance pursued elusive Yugoslav
tanks in the Kosovo countryside.
However, as the war progressed, American air-combat strategy increasingly held
sway, while Milosevic continued to hold
firm. The authors conclude that the diplomatic consensus was that the Yugoslav
dictator did not consider blinking until
faced with a united alliance that began
talking seriously about a ground war.
Milosevic eventually yielded when his last
possible ally, Russia, conspicuously associated itself with the message of alliance
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resolve. The authors leave us with the
(lukewarm) lesson that airpower, properly employed, is a necessary, albeit insufficient, tool of defense and foreign
policy.
The Kosovo war provides today’s students of international affairs a textbook
case in the traditional art of statecraft in
the world of realpolitik. Many old lessons
are emphasized: strategy must be driven
by policy, coercive diplomacy works only
when one possesses military might and
resolve, armed forces must be given
proper strategic direction, and alliance
solidarity is crucial.
However, Winning Ugly adds new lessons
as well, because Kosovo was Nato’s principal test to date in conducting military
operations outside its borders against a
sovereign nation for essentially humanitarian purposes. Nato’s performance in
Kosovo may have helped define the practicality and desirability of this role in the
twenty-first-century world. This book
enhances our understanding of what may
become the future of Nato as well as
some part of the future of war.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

House, Jonathan M. Combined Arms Warfare in the
Twentieth Century. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
2001. 364pp. $45

A retired Army officer formerly on the
faculty of the Command and General
Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Jonathan House has written an updated edition of a text he authored in the
1980s to support the education of Army
officers. His express intentions are to
strip the jargon in order to make the
subject intelligible to a more general

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss1/19

readership, and to update the book with
an analysis of combined-arms progress
in the 1990s. The result is a readable and
lucid analysis of combined-arms warfare
in the twentieth century, a work that a
layman can follow without keeping a dictionary of military terms handy.
For those with a genuine interest in military affairs, this book is ultimately rewarding. However, it is more about
organizational dynamics than about battles and tactics, and that may prove tedious to the casual reader. House
methodically traces the development of
combined-arms practice in the major armies of the world, offering just enough
description of battles and campaigns to
illustrate the effects of the various technical and organizational developments over
the years.
House tends to focus his analysis through
the lens of organizational design (an inclination shared by this reviewer) and
comes up with some interesting results
that do not always conform to conventional wisdom. For instance, he makes
the case that the French and British defeat in the 1940 Battle of France can be
adequately explained by their centralized
and “stovepiped” organizational structure, which inhibited the formation of
flexible combined-arms task forces.
Moreover, the lack of experience in defending against a fluid combined-arms
offensive caused the allies to create a
rather brittle, forward-focused defense
instead of the defense in tactical and operational depth that was later found effective against the blitzkrieg. In addition,
the failure of the German advance into
the Soviet Union in 1941 was due not so
much to the oft-cited reduction in panzer
divisions (which House cites as an actual
advantage, in that it created more balanced divisional structures) as to the

2

